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UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY AsS'N: 
THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT, 
LIBRARY FILTERING, AND INSTITUTIONAL ROLES 
By Felix Wu 
The explosive growth of the Internet over the last decade has revolu-
tionized communications, greatly expanding the potential audience for any 
one message and the messages available to any one person. There is more 
of every kind of communication, from personal correspondence to com-
mercial transactions, and from political commentary to pornography. It is 
the ready availability of pornography on the Internet that has troubled 
many in the United States, some of whom claim that such material threat-
ens to undermine the development of the Internet as a whole. 1 In particu-
lar, there is substantial concern that the future of the Internet as an educa-
tional tool for children depends on being able to prevent children from 
seeking out or stumbling upon pornographic material.2 
Congress initially responded to this concern by regulating the Internet 
directly, attempting to ban the transmission of indecent material to mi-
nors.3 However, the Supreme Court has all but stated that such efforts are 
doomed to failure, because any attempt to restrict minors' access to speech 
will impermissibly restrict adults' access to the same speech.4 The Court 
© 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. 
l. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("The Government appar-
ently assumes that the unregulated availability of ' indecent' and 'patently offensive' ma-
terial on the Internet is driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the 
risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material."). 
2. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 19-20 (Dick Thornburgh & 
Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) ("Success in dealing with [concerns about pornography] is 
arguably a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for fully exploiting the social and edu-
cational potential of the Internet for children."), available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/ 
youth _internet/. 
3. See Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)); Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(CDA), Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, 133-36 ( codified as amended at 4 7 
u.s.c. § 223 (2000)). 
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down CDA § 502 except as 
applied to child pornography); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (raising 
questions about the constitutionality of COPA); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 
2003) (affirming the grant ofa preliminary injunction against COPA), cert. granted, 124 
S. Ct. 399 (2003). 
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has suggested that a better approach might be to allow individuals to filter 
the content they receive at home, so that adults can decide for themselves 
how to control what they and their children see.5 
Congress' latest attempt to protect children from pornography takes up 
the idea of filters, but moves it from the home to public libraries and 
schools, raising First Amendment questions in the process. The Children's 
Internet Protection Act (CIPA) requires that libraries enable filters on all 
Internet-accessible computers in order to receive federal subsidies for 
Internet access and related computer equipment.6 In United States v. 
American Library Ass 'n ("ALA If'), a highly fractured Supreme Court 
held that the Act does not violate the First Amendment because libraries 
have the discretion to provide only filtered Internet access and Congress 
has the discretion to refuse subsidies to libraries with unfiltered access. 7 
The constitutionality of CIPA hinges primarily on the level of scrutiny 
a court should apply to the Act. This question in tum implicates a host of 
First Amendment doctrines, including public forum doctrine, editorial dis-
cretion cases, the selection-removal distinction, and prior restraint doc-
trine. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never laid out a consistent 
framework for dealing with these different doctrines, and as a result, the 
many opinions in this case talk past each other, each using a different doc-
trinal framework without explaining why one framework should be pre-
ferred over another. 
Reconciling the competing doctrines and cases is possible if one un-
derstands that to choose among them is to make judgments about the so-
cial roles of various institutions. To say that the public forum doctrine 
does or does not apply to this case is to say something about the role of 
libraries, the nature of the Internet, and the place for federal subsidies to 
libraries. Framing the debate in this way clarifies the real differences in a 
way that First Amendment doctrines standing alone do not. More impor-
tantly, by focusing on institutions, courts have a way of grounding the in-
evitably normative judgments that these doctrines invite. Whether or not 
library Internet access is a public forum depends on how one characterizes 
such access. In the absence of constraints on this characterization, courts 
remain free to choose whatever characterization justifies the ultimate re-
5. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877. 
6. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763A-335 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) 
(2000)). The Act also requires the filtering of Internet content on public school com-
puters, but this provision was not at issue in this case and will not be analyzed in this 
Note. 
7. 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) [hereinafter ALA II] . 
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sult they reach. The characterization of library Internet access should de-
pend, however, on the characterization of libraries and the characterization 
of the Internet. The histories and social roles of these institutions limit the 
universe of plausible characterizations of library Internet access. 
In particular, in the case of government restrictions on public spaces or 
public subsidies, there are at least two distinct institutions that matter: the 
government entity making the restriction and the space8 being restricted. 
Whether the entity can restrict the space consistent with the First Amend-
ment should depend on the level and type of discretion entrusted to it as an 
institution, and on the openness of the space, as an institution, to public 
discourse. Courts often use one or both of these factors, but they rarely do 
so explicitly, leading to gaps in their analysis. Thus, the plurality in ALA II 
fixates on the need to continue to defer to libraries' book selection deci-
sions, even though such deference is ambiguous at best in defining the role 
of libraries and potentially inapplicable in the context of the Internet. An 
explicit analysis of institutions suggests that the evolution of librarians 
from gatekeepers to information managers and the interactive nature of the 
Internet together require that library filtering be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Similarly, the role of the federal government in libraries and the federal 
interest in using subsidies to promote widespread Internet access together 
suggest that the decision to mandate filters as part of a federal funding 
program is also subject to strict scrutiny. Because the Act cannot pass 
strict scrutiny, the Court erred in upholding it. 
Part I describes the treatment of pornography under the First Amend-
ment, explains why filtering technology poses First Amendment problems, 
and sets out the doctrines that courts have applied to these problems. Part 
II fits the ALA II opinions into this First Amendment framework. Finally, 
Part III explores the importance of the social roles of institutions to the 
application of First Amendment doctrines, examining the roles of libraries, 
of Internet access, and of federal funding for libraries and Internet access. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To understand ALA II, one must understand not only the Act in ques-
tion, but also the reasons why filtering pornography tends to raise First 
8. Throughout this Note, "space" refers to both physical spaces and the nonphysi-
cal "spaces" created by funding programs. One can conceive of those who receive fund-
ing as having been admitted into the space created by the program. See Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,830 (1995) ("The [fund] is a forum 
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are 
applicable."); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 
(1985) (applying public forum doctrine to a charity drive aimed at federal employees). 
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Amendment issues and the tools courts have used to deal with similar is-
sues in the past. 
A. Children's Internet Protection Act 
CIPA requires that a library may only receive funds under two pro-
grams designed to subsidize the cost of Internet access and associated 
computer equipment if 
(A) such library-
(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety for minors that in-
cludes the operation of a technology protection measure with re-
spect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects 
against access through such computers to visual depictions that 
are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors; and 
(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection 
measure during any use of such computers by minors; and 
(B) such library-
(i) has in place a policy of Internet safety that includes the opera-
tion of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its 
computers with Internet access that protects against access 
through such computers to visual depictions that are obscene or 
child pornography; and 
(ii) is enforcing the operation of such technology protection 
measure during any use of such computers. 9 
Libraries "may disable a technology protection measure ... to enable ac-
cess for bona fide research or other lawful purposes." 10 One program re-
stricts such disabling to "use by an adult. "11 
B. Pornographic Content and Filtering Technology 
Not all content that might be considered pornographic receives the 
same treatment under the First Amendment. Two types of pornography 
can be banned outright: obscenity12 and child pornography. 13 The First 
9. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(l) (restricting grants under the Library Services and Tech-
nology Act); see also 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(8)-(C) (placing similar restrictions on dis-
counts under the E-rate program). 
10. 20 u.s.c. § 9134(f)(3). 
11. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(P). 
12. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining the test for obscenity). 
Material is obscene if: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
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Amendment protects pornography that does not fall into one of these two 
categories, and governments cannot restrict adult access to such material.14 
Much of this material is considered "harmful to minors," however, and 
access by minors can be restricted.15 Ostensibly, the goal of CIPA is to 
restrict all access to obscenity and child pornography and to restrict mi-
nors' access to material harmful to minors. 16 
If it were possible to filter out only material in these three categories 
(two for adults), filtering would pose no constitutional issue; the problem 
is that no filter can block precisely the content that fits into one of the le-
gal categories.17 The predominant form of filtering technology in use to-
day consists of software that compares each request for a Web page 
against a precompiled control list of pages.18 The control list is generally 
divided into categories of potentially objectionable content, one or more of 
which usually deals with sexual content. 19 If a given category has been 
selected, the software will block all requests for Web pages within that 
Id. 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value. 
13. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (finding that for child pornogra-
phy, the Miller test should be adjusted such that "[a] trier of fact need not find that the 
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sex-
ual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue 
need not be considered as a whole"). 
14. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (invalidating a ban 
on "virtual" child pornography- material produced using adults, but made to look like 
child pornography); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[T]he Government may 
not 'reduce the adult population [ to consuming] only what is fit for children."') ( quoting 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996)) (brackets 
added). 
15. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(l) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(8)-(C). 
17. The focus here is on the technological limits of filters, but even if filters were 
technologically perfect, uncertainty about the application of the Miller test would still 
lead to filtering errors. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1974) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the result) ("Thus, it is clear that as long as the Miller test remains in effect 
' one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this 
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so."') ( quoting Paris 
Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
18. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 428 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
[hereinafter ALA I]. See generally Richard J. Peltz, Use "The Filter You Were Born 
With": The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of 
Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REv. 397, 404- 16 (2002) (discussing the technology and 
limits of filtering). 
19. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 428. 
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category. While each software company compiles its control list somewhat 
differently (and keeps secret its process for doing so),20 the basic idea is 
that the company first searches the Web to find the universe of Web pages, 
much as a search engine might do, then uses automated techniques to try 
to focus on potentially objectionable pages, and then employs some hu-
man review of the content on these pages.21 Companies do not generally 
re-review pages on a systematic basis.22 
This process inevitably leads to both underblocking, the omission of 
objectionable pages from the control list, and overblocking, the inclusion 
of unobjectionable pages on the control list.23 Underblocking happens be-
cause no search can find every Web page, pages are constantly being 
added, and automated screening cannot detect pages with objectionable 
pictures but no text.24 Overblocking happens because the automated 
screening is very imprecise, and the subsequent human review is either not 
comprehensive or prone to error.25 Furthermore, overblocking and under-
blocking occur when Web page content changes from objectionable to un-
objectionable, or vice versa, between when the control lists are compiled 
and when they are used.26 Given the technological limitations, any filter-
ing system that blocks enough unprotected content to be considered an 
effective technology protection measure will also block a substantial 
amount of protected content. 27 
Because of the substantial overblocking, courts would likely hold that 
banning outright all material blocked by any given software filter would 
be overbroad and hence a violation of the First Amendment.28 The ques-
tion in this case is whether a public library's use of the same filter violates 
the First Amendment, and if not, whether Congress can require such filter-
ing as a condition of federal funding. 
C. Library Filtering and First Amendment Doctrines 
Before ALA I, the only case to address the constitutionality of library 
Internet filtering was Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the 
20. Id. at 430. 
21. Id. at 430-33. 
22. Id. at 435-36. 
23. /d. at436-37. 
24. Id. at 431-32. 
25. Id. at 432-35. 
26. Id. at 435-36. 
27. Id. at 450. 
28. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-79 ( 1997) (finding the coverage of the 
CDA to be overbroad). 
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Loudoun County Library.29 In Loudoun, members of the local community 
challenged the library board' s decision to install filters on all library com-
puters. In finding the library's policy unconstitutional, the district court 
held that library Internet filtering was: (1) a content-based restriction in a 
limited public forum;30 (2) not simply an exercise of the library's discre-
tion in selecting materials for its collection;31 (3) a content-based removal 
decision;32 and (4) a prior restraint.33 For all of these reasons, the court 
applied strict scrutiny.34 Finding "many less restrictive means available," 
including the possibility of only filtering children's access, the court in-
validated the library policy.35 The three-judge district court panel36 in ALA 
I used similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion that library Internet 
filtering is unconstitutional, and thus found CIPA unconstitutional.37 Each 
of these lines of First Amendment doctrine, as well as their application in 
Loudoun and ALA /, will be examined below. 
I. Public Forum Doctrine 
Public forum doctrine captures the idea that the more a government 
venue is open to speech and sReakers, the less control the government has 
over speech within the venue. 8 Courts have devided such venues into four 
categories: traditional public forums, limited public forums, nonpublic fo-
rums, and nonforums. Traditional public forums are places such as streets 
and parks that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
29. 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun II] (granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment); 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun 
/] (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment). 
30. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
31 . Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94. 
32. Id. at 794-95. 
33. Id. at 797. 
34. Under strict scrutiny, "[a] content-based limitation on speech will be upheld 
only where the state demonstrates that the limitation 'is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 
2d at 564 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
( 1983)). Part of this test involves determining whether the limitation is the "least restric-
tive means" to achieve those interests. Id. at 566. 
35. Id. at 566-67. 
36. CIP A stipulates that challenges to its constitutionality will be heard by a three-
judge district court panel and provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of any 
decision holding the act unconstitutional. See CIPA, Pub. L. No. I 06-554, § 1741, 114 
Stat. 2763A-335, -351 to -352 (2000). 
37. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
38. See Perry Educ. Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
2004) UNITED STATES v . AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS'N 563 
communicating information, libraries were open to the public generally, 
and the nature of libraries was compatible with communicative activity.49 
All three factors suggested that the government had designed libraries to 
provide the widest possible access to the written word.50 
The Loudoun court cited Kreimer and used the same factors to find 
that the library, considered as a whole, is a limited public forum.51 The 
ALA I court noted that the access sought in the case defined the relevant 
forum, so that in this case, it was library Internet access, and not the access 
to library as a whole or the library' s book collection, that defined the rele-
vant forum. 52 The court also distinguished between content restrictions 
that define the boundaries of a limited public forum, and content restric-
tions within a limited public forum, noting that the former is subject to 
more lenient review.53 Finding that filtering removes content from what is 
otherwise a relatively broad forum, the court held that Internet filtering did 
not simply define the boundaries of a limited forum and was therefore sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.54 
2. Editorial Discretion 
An important class of cases that courts have held to lie outside the 
public forum doctrine is those in which the government legitimately exer-
cises some form of editorial discretion. Thus, in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes,55 the Court held that public television 
stations have wide latitude in deciding which programs to air, and in Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,56 the Court held that the NEA has 
wide latitude in deciding which proposals to fund. Courts have almost 
universally suggested that libraries have the same discretion in deciding 
which books to acquire.57 The ALA I court, however, held that such discre-
tion did not apply to decisions about Internet filtering, reasoning that dis-
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
52. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 455-56 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
53. Id. at 457. 
54. Id. at 461. 
55. 523 U.S. 666 (I 998). 
56. 524 U.S. 569 (I 998). 
57. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 ( 1982) ("Petitioners rightly 
possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries."); ALA I, 
201 F. Supp. 2d at 462 ("[W]e agree . .. that generally the First Amendment subjects 
libraries' content-based decisions about which print materials to acquire for their collec-
tions to only rational review."). 
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tions. "39 Such forums cannot be closed, and any content-based restrictions 
within them are subject to strict scrutiny.40 
Limited or designated public forums are venues the government sets 
aside for expressive activity, often for a particular purpose and possibly 
for a particular set of participants. Examples include fiublic university 
meeting spaces available to registered student groups, 1 and municipal 
theaters available for arts productions.42 Such forums can be closed, and 
the government has some leeway in defining the boundaries of the forum, 
but otherwise, content-based restrictions are still subject to strict scru-
tiny.43 
Nonpublic forums are venues in which communicative activity occurs, 
but which the government has not oeened for such activity; one example is 
a public school teacher's mailbox. In nonpublic forums, content-based 
restrictions need only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expres-
sion merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.',45 Finally, 
non-forums are venues not designed for public discourse of any sort. In 
such spaces, the government can eliminate speech altogether or use the 
venue to promote its own views without providing an opportunity to re-
spond. 46 
Thus, to determine whether to apply strict scrutiny, one issue courts 
need to consider is whether the relevant venue is a limited public forum. In 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, the court determined that a library is a lim-
ited public forum, in the course of deciding whether the libr3!1' could ex-
clude a homeless man for violating its patron conduct rules.4 The court 
cited three factors relevant to this determination: government intent, extent 
of use, and the nature of the forum.48 In assessing these factors, the court 
noted that the government established libraries for the express purpose of 
39. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
41. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
42. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
44. Id. at 46-47. 
45. Id. at 46. 
46. Courts generally do not use the label "non-forums" in the context of public fo-
rum doctrine. Rather, courts often speak about "whether public forum principles apply to 
the case at all." See Ark. Educ. Television Comm' n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672 (1998). 
When venues are found to be non-forums, that is, outside the other forum categories, 
courts allow the venue to "facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others." 
Id. at 674. 
47. 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992). 
48. Id. at 1259-62. 
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cretion only applied to judgments that singled out speech of particular 
value, rather than those that excluded disfavored speech.58 
3. The Selection-Removal Distinction 
In making this distinction, the ALA I court joined the Loudoun court in 
distinguishing between a library's selection decisions and its removal de-
cisions. This distinction originated in the case of Board of Education v. 
Pico.59 In Pico, a local school board removed books from a public high 
school library that it felt were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
[Semitic ], and just plain filthy.' ,6° Justice Brennan, writing for the plural-
ity, held that although schools had substantial discretion to determine the 
content of their libraries, they could not exercise that discretion "in a nar-
rowly partisan or political manner," and that books could be removed 
based on their "educational suitability," but not based on their ideas.61 Jus-
tice Brennan further noted that his opinion was limited to the removal of 
books, and not their acquisition,62 a distinction that drew fire from Justice 
Rehnquist,63 and that has been the subject of much commentary, particu-
larly in the library filtering context.64 
The Loudoun court applied the distinction and determined that Internet 
filtering was a removal decision, not a selection decision.65 The court 
found that the Internet is an integrated whole and that in deciding to pur-
chase Internet access, "each Loudoun libra~ has made all Internet publi-
cations instantly accessible to its patrons." 6 A single purchase provided 
complete access, and the library need not spend additional funds to access 
58. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 462-66. 
59. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
60. Id. at 857. 
61. Id. at 870-71. 
62. Id. at 871-72. 
63. Id. at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]his distinction between acquisition and 
removal makes little sense. The failure of a library to acquire a book denies access to its 
contents just as effectively as does the removal of the book from the library's shelf."). 
64. See Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on 
Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 215-16 
(2001) (arguing that filtering is a removal decision); Mark S. Nadel, The First Amend-
ment 's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What 
Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1117, 1122-27 (2000) (suggesting 
that only viewpoint neutrality is required in both selection and removal decisions); Peltz, 
supra note 18, at 468-75 (distinguishing filtering from book selection, regardless of 
whether an abstract selection-removal distinction can be made); David F. Norden, Note, 
Filtering Out Protection: The Law, the Library, and Our Legacies, 53 CASE W. R ES. L. 
REV. 767, 786-89 (2003) (arguing that filtering is a selection decision). 
65. Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
66. Id. at 793. 
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any particular Web page; in fact, the library had to spend additional funds 
in order to block Web pages.67 
After the Loudoun decision, Mark Nadel criticized the idea that re-
source constraints would only push libraries to offer more Internet content 
and not less.68 Nadel noted that time on Internet-accessible computers is 
often a scarce resource and that libraries should have the same discretion 
in deciding how to fill that time as they do in deciding how to fill their 
shelves.69 The ALA I court quoted Nadel on this point approvingly,70 but 
nevertheless found that Internet filtering is a removal decision, noting that 
filters make an affirmative judgment about what content to exclude, rather 
than an affirmative judgment about what content to allow.71 
4. Prior Restraint Doctrine 
Prior restraint doctrine places a strong presumption of unconstitution-
ality on any government attempt to prevent speech beforehand, rather than 
sanctioning it after the fact. The theory is that such prior restraints have a 
"chilling effect,"72 potentially deterring speech that would be found lawful 
after a full judicial review. One result of this doctrine is that an otherwise 
impermissible ban on speech is generally still impermissible even if 
speakers are given the opportunity to petition to circumvent the ban. 
In the Internet filtering context, courts have invoked prior restraint 
doctrine to hold that if filtering is impermissible, it remains so even if li-
brary patrons have the opportunity to request that individual pages be un-
blocked. 73 Often cited is Lamont v. Postmaster General, in which the 
Court struck down a provision requiring the postal service to separate out 
"communist political propaganda," and deliver it only on request.74 Citing 
Lamont, both the Loudoun court and the ALA I court held that the library's 
unblocking policy did not cure any constitutional defects in the filtering 
policy, even if library staff had no discretion in deciding whether to fulfill 
a patron's request. 75 
67. Id. 
68. Nadel, supra note 64, at 1128-29. 
69. Id. 
70. ALA I , 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,465 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
71. Id. at 464-65. 
72. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965). 
73. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486; Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
74. 381 U.S. 301 (1943). 
75. ALA I , 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486; Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In ALA II, most of the members of the Court analyzed the constitution-
ality of CIP A in two parts. First, as an exercise of Congress' spending 
power, CIP A would be unconstitutional under South Dakota v. Dole76 if it 
required states to violate the Constitution.77 This inquiry is equivalent to 
asking whether libraries infringe the First Amendment rights of their pa-
trons by installing filters, independently of CIP A. Second, CIP A would be 
unconstitutional if it conditioned federal funding on the surrender of First 
Amendment rights.78 Whether libraries have First Amendment rights to 
surrender, or whether they can assert the rights of their patrons, is unclear, 
but while the plurality expressed some doubt about the existence of such 
rights, it ultimately assumed that the rights do exist.79 This second inquiry 
then amounts to asking whether, even if a library could constitutionally 
filter Internet access, Congress can constitutionally require libraries to do 
so. 
A. The Constitutionality of Library Filtering 
Seven members of the Court held that libraries could constitutionally 
implement a filtering program under CIP A, though only four could agree 
on a rationale. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, held that 
public forum doctrine was inapplicable to the case because "[a] public li-
brary does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public forum 
for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects books 
in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak."80 
Justice Rehnquist held instead that as in Forbes and Finley, libraries have 
the right and responsibility to make discretionary judgments about the ma-
terial provided to patrons, and that this judgment is subject to lenient judi-
cial review.81 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist rejected any distinction be-
tween selection and removal, holding that a library's decision to employ a 
filter was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.82 Finally, Justice 
Rehnquist suggested that there was no prior restraint problem, writing that 
"the Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a 
public library without any risk of embarrassment."83 
76. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
77. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (2003). 
78. Id. at 2307. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 2305. 
81. Id. at 2304. 
82. Id. at 2306. 
83. Id. at 2307. 
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Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that a se-
lection-removal distinction was defensible and should have been applied 
in this case. Justice Souter characterized the deference given to selection 
decisions as being administrative in nature, based in the difficulty of judi-
cially reviewing the numerous resource-constrained decisions librarians 
make. 84 Justice Souter acknowledged that resources to provide Internet 
access might also be limited, but suggested that these limitations did not 
justify filtering.85 Hence, Justice Souter argued that strict scrutiny applied 
to a library's decision to filter.86 Filtering failed strict scrutiny, according 
to Justice Souter, because restricting only children to filtered access is a 
less restrictive means of achieving the interest in protecting children.87 
The remaining three members of the Court focused in one way or an-
other on the unblocking provisions of CIP A. Justice Kennedy, citing no 
case law, argued that the need to request that pages be unblocked was not 
a constitutional burden of "any significant degree."88 Justice Breyer ar-
gued for the novel proposition that the selection-removal debate should be 
resolved by applying intermediate scrutiny.89 Under intermediate scrutiny, 
Justice Breyer found that the unblocking provisions ensured a reasonable 
fit between the filtering policy and the government's interest in protecting 
children.90 Justice Stevens argued that library filtering was constitutional, 
despite characterizing CIPA as a prior restraint.91 For Justice Stevens, this 
characterization of CIP A indicated not that library Internet filtering was 
unconstitutional, but that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require 
such filtering. 92 
B. The Constitutionality of Congress' Funding Condition 
The plurality and Justice Stevens agreed that filtering was constitu-
tional, and each went on to consider whether CIP A might nevertheless be 
unconstitutional. In dividing on this question, the two opinions took very 
different approaches to resolving two leading cases in the area: Rust v. 
Su/livan93 and Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez.94 In Rust, the 
84. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 2321 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
89. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
90. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
9 I. Id. at 23 I 3 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
92. Id. 
93. 500 U.S. 173 (1991 ). 
94. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
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Court upheld a restriction preventing doctors receiving funding under a 
specific program from engaging in abortion counseling, while in Ve-
lazquez, the Court struck down a restriction preventing lawyers receiving 
funding under a specific program from challenging welfare laws. In up-
holding CIPA, Justice Rehnquist cited Rust for the general proposition that 
the government is allowed to dictate how its money will be spent, and dis-
tinguished Velazquez as a case in which the speech being funded was in-
herently anti-government.95 In voting to strike down CIP A, Justice Ste-
vens cited Velazquez for the general proposition that the government is not 
allowed to distort the usual functioning of a medium of expression, and 
distinguished Rust as a case in which the government used private actors 
to convey its own viewpoint.96 
III. ANALYSIS 
What is most striking about the opinions in this case is that they dem-
onstrate that the Court lacks a broad framework within which to under-
stand the different First Amendment doctrines that might apply. Thus, the 
district court relied primarily on public forum doctrine,97 but the plurality 
in the Supreme Court found such reliance "out of place in the context of 
this case," invoking instead the cases on editorial discretion.98 On the 
other hand, Justice Souter's dissent relied on Pico, unmentioned by the 
plurality, while not addressing Forbes and Finley, and e~ressing no view 
on whether public forum principles applied to the case. The other three 
opinions proposed entirely different approaches to the problem, largely 
without explaining why they rejected the application of other doctrines.100 
A satisfactory reconciliation of these different doctrines and lines of 
cases requires a broader First Amendment framework in order to under-
stand what factors are relevant when applying the doctrines to any given 
case. Without such a framework, the Court's opinions seem ad hoc, con-
vincing only to those who share the same underlying assumptions. Expos-
ing these assumptions at least clarifies any essential differences, and ide-
ally also makes possible other arguments for reaching a particular conclu-
sion m a case. 
95. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307-08. 
96. Id. at2316-17. 
91. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
98. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304. 
99. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
100. See id. at 2309-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2310-12 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2312-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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This Note suggests that in the context of restrictions on government 
spaces, courts should analyze two different institutional roles- that of the 
government entity making the restriction and that of the space being re-
stricted- in order to apply First Amendment doctrines to the restriction. In 
analyzing the government entity, courts should consider whether the pro-
posed restriction is consistent with the level and type of discretion en-
trusted to that entity. In analyzing the government space, courts should 
consider whether the restriction is consistent with the features and degree 
of openness of the space. In both cases, the question is whether the restric-
tion comports with the social role played by the various institutions. Nei-
ther government entities nor government spaces exist in a vacuum; courts 
should look to the history of such entities and spaces, as well as their in-
teraction with other institutions, in order to decide whether their nature 
supports or undermines the proposed restriction. 
Many commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's current 
First Amendment jurisprudence has become encumbered by doctrinal 
categories which, thoufflh based upon sound intuitions, now lack any un-
derlying justifications.1 1 Professor Robert Post, in particular, has argued 
that the underlying intuitions are highly contextual, and that rather than 
seek principles that are context-independent, the Court should formulate 
princif les that explicitly describe the ways in which social context mat-
ters.10 Looking to the history and nature of government entities and 
spaces describes one particular way in which context matters. 
Part III.A describes Professor Post's theories and two contexts that 
matter in this case: the social role of the space and the role of the entity 
intervening in the space. Part 111.B applies this framework to libraries' de-
cisions to filter, arguing that an analysis of the role of libraries and of the 
features of the Internet suggests that library filtering should be unconstitu-
tional. Part IIJ.C applies this framework to the federal government's deci-
sion to impose a filtering condition on federal funding. Here again, the 
purpose of the Internet subsidy program and the role of the federal gov-
ernment in local libraries suggest that CIPA should be unconstitutional. 
IOI. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]; Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amend-
ment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001). 
102. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outra-
geous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. 
L. REv. 603 (I 990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; Post, Recuperating, supra 
note 10 I; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, I 06 YALE L.J. 151 (1996) [hereinafter Post, 
Subsidized Speech]. 
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A. Forums, Funding, and the First Amendment 
In the context of subsidized speech, 103 Professor Post has posited two 
contextual distinctions to separate government restrictions subject to strict 
scrutiny from those subject to a more lenient standard of review. 104 The 
first distinction is between regulations of public discourse and regulations 
in the managerial domain; the latter describes those regulations that affect 
speech as only a means to some legitimate government end.105 For exam-
ple, a school's decision to favor some papers over others (with better 
grades) is best seen as a means to achieve educational goals and not a re-
striction on students' speech; such a decision is subject to a lenient stan-
dard of review. 106 The second distinction is between regulations that con-
strain private conduct and regulations that provide internal directives to 
government agencies.107 Hence, the decision to dedicate the Kennedy Cen-
ter to performing arts, rather than political speech, receives deference as 
an internal directive, while a decision to dedicate the second-class mailing 
rate to only some kinds of magazines would receive scrutiny as a con-
straint on private conduct. 108 
Applying these distinctions requires two normative characterizations: 
first, a characterization of the regulated speech, to determine whether it is 
within or outside public discourse; and second, a characterization of the 
government action, to determine whether it is directed internally or exter-
nally .109 Professor Post recognizes that these characterizations must in tum 
depend on other factors, and he cites both Professor Seth Kreimer's base-
lines110 and Professor Kathleen Sullivan's distribution of rights111 asap-
propriate factors. 112 
I 03. Subsidized speech refers to expressive activities for which the government pro-
vides funds. When the government attaches conditions to the speech it subsidizes, this 
raises line-drawing issues that are analytically similar to the other issues considered here. 
See supra note 8. 
104. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 102; see also Matthew Thomas Kline, 
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, Note, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 347 (1999) (applying Post's framework to the Loudoun court's 
decision). 
105. Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 102, at 164. 
106. Id. at 166. 
107. /datl76. 
l 08. Id. at 178-79. 
109. Id. at 119. 
110. See Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in 
a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984) (describing the use of history, equality, 
and predictions about the future as baselines to determine whether government regula-
tions are penalties or subsidies). 
111. See Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
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This Note suggests a somewhat different method of characterization, 
one that focuses on relevant institutions.113 The idea is that institutions 
have histories and social roles, and that these histories and roles can be 
used to constrain judicial characterizations. In particular, characterization 
of the regulated speech should depend on a characterization of the space in 
which the speech resides, and characterization of the government action 
should depend on a characterization of the government actor. In analyzing 
the space, courts should consider its compatibility with and openness to 
speech, while in analyzing the government actor, courts should consider 
the level and type of discretion entrusted to it. These analyses will incor-
porate the history of these institutions and the ways in which they interact 
with other institutions. These histories and interactions provide a founda-
tion for courts to apply First Amendment doctrine, dictating whether it is 
appropriate to invoke public forum doctrine, editorial discretion, or the 
selection-removal distinction. By referring to such evidence about social 
roles, courts can avoid the potential circularity or groundlessness of asser-
tions based solely in doctrine- assertions that strike many as reflecting 
nothing more than personal opinions about the merits of the case at hand. 
Characterizations of the space regulated and the actor regulating ap-
pear throughout the Court's First Amendment cases, but the Court rarely 
highlights the importance of such considerations to the result they reach. 
Velazquez demonstrates the need for the characterization of the §overn-
ment space to be consistent with the roles of related institutions. 11 There 
the Court held that to prevent legal aid attorneys from challenging welfare 
laws was to distort the "usual functioning" of a medium of expression.115 
To determine the "usual functioning," the Court must have looked to 
something other than the government legal aid program in question. In-
deed, the Court noted that the legal aid program used "the State and Fed-
eral courts and the independent bar on which those courts depend" in order 
to accomplish the program's goals. 11 6 Having established a program that 
was integrated into the legal system as a whole, Congress could not regu-
late the program in ways that were inconsistent with the features of the 
( 1989) (suggesting that courts should consider the effect of regulations on three types of 
distributions of rights: between the public and private realms, among rightholders, and 
among those with varying dependency on government benefits). 
11 2. Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note I 02, at 179-80. 
113. See also Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 
112 HARV. L. R.Ev. 84 (1998) (arguing that courts should develop institution-specific 
First Amendment doctrines). 
114. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
115. Id. at 543. 
116. Id. at 544. 
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American legal system: in this case, with the autonomy given to lawyers 
to advance all reasonable arguments on behalf of their clients.117 
The Velazquez Court also noted the application of this principle to 
public forum and editorial discretion cases, citing Rosenberger and 
Forbes.118 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a fund for university stu-
dent newspapers created a limited public forum, from which the university 
could not exclude religious publications.11 9 The Velazquez Court noted as 
important to this result "the fact that student newspapers expressed many 
different points of view."120 This claim presumably reflects not an empiri-
cal fact, but rather a characterization of the space the university tried to 
regulate. Similar considerations can also inform the decision to reject pub-
lic forum principles and instead follow cases such as Forbes and Finley, 
granting broad editorial discretion to government entities. Thus, the Ve-
lazquez Court referred to the result in Forbes as being based in "the dy-
namics of the broadcasting system."12 1 
Finley provides an example in which the characterization of the gov-
ernment actor mattered to the Court. In Finley, the Court held that because 
the NEA already had discretion to evaluate proposals according to stan-
dards of "artistic excellence," it also had the discretion to consider the ge-
neric criteria of "decencl and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of 
the American public."12 Similarly, in Pico, the Court took into considera-
tion the wide discretion granted to school boards.123 
Discretion in one area, however, does not imply discretion in every 
area. Courts should analyze the nature of the discretion carefully to deter-
mine whether it applies in new settings. Thus, in Pico, despite recognizing 
the right of school boards "to establish and apply their curriculum in such 
a way as to transmit community values,"124 the plurality held that school 
libraries were different because, as libraries, they were places for inde-
117. Justice Rehnquist appears to have a different interpretation of Velazquez, 
namely, that the case stands for the proposition that the government may not restrict what 
is inherently speech pitted against the government. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003). 
Such a reading, while not entirely consistent with the language quoted above, does fit into 
the framework developed here. Justice Rehnquist focuses not on the space, but on the 
actor, reasoning that it is inconsistent to characterize the government as having the discre-
tion to restrict challenges to itself. 
118. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 . 
119. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
120. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543. 
121. Id. 
122. Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998). 
123. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 ( 1982). 
124. Id. at 864. 
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1. The Role of Libraries 
The plurality in ALA II focused on reconciling the result in the case 
with the deference given to library book selection policies. 134 The trouble 
with this approach is that deference is consistent with two different views 
of the role of the library, and this approach does not provide a principled 
way to choose between them. On the one hand, society might defer to li-
brary collection judgments because it is the role of libraries to guide soci-
ety's morals; on the other hand, courts might defer to such judgments sim-
ply because it is too difficult for them to separate proper from improper 
motives in the making of such judgments. 135 
The history of libraries suggests that while in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries librarians may have been expected to provide moral 
guidance to patrons, deference to librarians today is rooted mainly in pro-
cedural concerns.136 Where librarians were once information gatekeepers, 
they are now information managers. Modern librarians see their role as 
helping patrons to find the most appropriate material for their needs.137 
The modern rise of schools of "information management," to replace 
schools of "library science," reflects this change. 138 The writings of li-
brarians themselves also points to a changed role. Noticeably the quotation 
cited by the jglurality that most suggests a moral purpose for libraries dates 
from 1930.1 9 The American Library Association's current position is that 
"library materials 'should not be proscribed or removed because of parti-
san or doctrinal disapproval. "'140 
The plurality's characterization of libraries seems inconsistent with the 
role the public expects libraries to play, namely that of providing access to 
information. The plurality characterized libraries as having "broad discre-
tion," and suggested that public libraries have an editorial role analogous 
134. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304. 
135. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
136. See Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment 
Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in 
Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L.REV. 213, 219-34 (2003). 
137. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21. 
138. See Katherine S. Mangan, In Revamped Library Schools, Information Trumps 
Books, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A43; Kate Murphy, Moving From the 
Card Catalogue to the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at D5. 
139. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 ( quoting F. Drury, Book Selection at xi ( 1930) ("It is 
the aim of the selector to give the public, not everything it wants, but the best that it will 
read or use to advantage.")). 
140. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoting the American Library Association' s 
("ALA") Library Bill of Rights, which the ALA adopted in 1948). 
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In other contexts, however, selection and removal might not amount to the 
same thing. In particular, in the context of libraries, selection and removal 
decisions differ in the types of resource constraints faced and in the ability 
of courts to detect improper motives. 132 These contextual differences may 
mean that the discretion to select does not imply the discretion to remove. 
Thus, whether a restriction on a government space is a regulation of a 
limited public forum or an exercise of editorial discretion depends on the 
features and openness of the space and the discretion of the entity restrict-
ing the space. These, in turn, depend on whether restrictions and discretion 
are consistent with the histories and interactions of the relevant institu-
tions. In applying these principles to CIPA, it is important to distinguish 
between the two different spaces and two different government entities at 
issue in the case. To determine whether libraries can constitutionally filter 
Internet content, we consider the discretion granted to libraries and the na-
ture of library Internet access. To determine whether Congress can consti-
tutionally require library filtering, we consider the discretion granted to 
Congress vis-a-vis libraries and the nature of federal subsidy programs for 
library Internet access. Each will be analyzed in turn. 
B. The Constitutionality of Library Filtering 
The framework developed above suggests that to determine the consti-
tutionality of library filtering, courts should analyze the social role of li-
braries and of library Internet access. History provides a particularly use-
ful window on the former, and the characteristics of the Internet as a 
whole inform our determination of the latter. Both the modem evolution of 
librarians from gatekeepers to information managers and the open and 
interactive nature of the Internet suggest that public forum doctrines apply, 
rather than editorial discretion cases, and that there is reason to label filter-
ing decisions as removal decisions. 133 
132. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2321 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); Loudoun I, 2 
F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
133. Despite the opinions of Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Stevens, this case cannot 
tum on the unblocking provisions and prior restraint doctrine. On the one hand, Lamont 
holds that individuals cannot be required to affirmatively request access to protected 
speech, and therefore suggests that patrons should not be required to request unblocking 
of pages they have a right to see. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 486-89 (E.D. Pa. 
2002). On the other hand, almost any exercise of editorial discretion functions as a prior 
restraint as to those materials not selected, but courts have never viewed this as a prob-
lem. 
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way to choose between them. On the one hand, society might defer to li-
brary collection judgments because it is the role of libraries to guide soci-
ety's morals; on the other hand, courts might defer to such judgments sim-
ply because it is too difficult for them to separate proper from improper 
motives in the making of such judgments. 135 
The history of libraries suggests that while in the nineteenth and early 
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they are now information managers. Modem librarians see their role as 
helping patrons to find the most appropriate material for their needs. 137 
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schools of "library science," reflects this change. 138 The writings of li-
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cited by the jglurality that most suggests a moral purpose for libraries dates 
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The plurality's characterization of libraries seems inconsistent with the 
role the public expects libraries to play, namely that of providing access to 
information. The plurality characterized libraries as having "broad discre-
tion," and suggested that public libraries have an editorial role analogous 
134. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304. 
135. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
136. See Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment 
Implications of the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in 
Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 213, 219-34 (2003). 
137. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21. 
138. See Katherine S. Mangan, In Revamped Library Schools, Information Trumps 
Books, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A43; Kate Murphy, Moving From the 
Card Catalogue to the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, I 997, at D5. 
139. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting F. Drury, Book Selection at xi (1930) ("It is 
the aim of the selector to give the public, not everything it wants, but the best that it will 
read or use to advantage.")). 
140. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoting the American Library Association's 
("ALA") Library Bill of Rights, which the ALA adopted in 1948). 
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to that of public television stations. 141 However, while society needs li-
brarians to make certain inevitably content-based judgments, it is not at all 
clear that libraries have the sort of discretion that television stations have. 
For example, suppose a public television station refused to broadcast pro-
grams on the abortion debate, whatever the viewpoint, claiming that such 
programs are too controversial. For bes suggests that such a decision 
would be well within the discretion of the station, 142 and viewers would 
probably accept both the decision and the explanation. Now suppose a 
public library refused to acquire books about the abortion debate for the 
same reason. This decision seems inconsistent with the library's role in 
providing access to information in a way that the television station's 
equivalent decision does not conflict with its more selective role. 
Of course, the library might fail to acquire books about the abortion 
debate in the course of filling its shelves with other books. This result 
could be consistent with the library's role, since in the fac.e of limited re-
sources, the library must choose to provide access to some materials over 
others. The difference is that in making this type of decision, the library 
makes a comparative judgment about the relative value of different mate-
rial, while in refusing to collect books on certain topics, the library makes 
an absolute value judgment. In focusing on the evaluation of individual 
materials, rather than on collection decisions as a whole, the plurality 
made a subtle and unwarranted shift from approving comparative judg-
ments to approving absolute judgments.143 Resource constraints make 
comparative judgments necessary, since in order to fulfill the goal of pro-
viding access to information, libraries must develop their collections 
within the applicable constraints in some systematic way. Absolute judg-
ments are not consistent with this goal, however, since such judgments 
deny access to some information without also providing access to other 
information.144 
141. ALA I/, 123 S. Ct. at 2304. 
142. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,682 (1998). 
143. Compare ALA I/, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 ("[L]ibraries collect only those materials 
deemed to have ' requisite and appropriate quality."') (quoting ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 
421), with ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421 ("[L]ibrarians . . . build, develop and create col-
lections that have certain characteristics, such as balance in its coverage and requisite and 
appropriate quality."). 
144. Of course, libraries can (and must) make absolute judgments in eliminating ob-
scenity and child pornography, but the categorization of some speech as illegal is itself 
the absolute judgment upon which the library bases its action. Cf Laughlin, supra note 
136, at 264-65 (arguing that librarians must make the sometimes hard decision about 
whether specific material is obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors). 
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Thus, the real distinction in the context of libraries is not between se-
lection decisions and removal decisions, but between resource-constrained 
failures to acquire, which involve comparative judgments, and refusals to 
acquire and outright removals, which involve absolute judgments. 145 
Viewed in this light, it does not matter whether we characterize the block-
ing of a Web page as a failure to acquire the page or a removal of the 
page. In either case, the filter makes an absolute judgment about the 
page's value (or lack thereof). Even if libraries face a resource constraint 
in allocating time on Internet-accessible computers, 146 this constraint does 
not justify such absolute judgments. A library's decision about how best to 
fill its patrons' time on the Internet is different from its decision about 
how best to fill its book shelves. The latter is in furtherance of its goal of 
providing information to its patrons, while the former puts the library back 
in its now disclaimed position as arbiter of society's morals.147 
2. The Characteristics of the Internet 
The difference in the type of resource constraints faced provides at 
least one reason why library book collection policies and Internet filtering 
policies need not be treated alike under the First Amendment. Indeed, the 
Court has cautioned repeatedly that different media have different charac-
teristics, leading to different results for First Amendment purposes.148 It is 
important to consider how the features of the Internet determine the possi-
bilities for the characterization of library Internet access. 
In discussions about library filtering, courts often conceive of the 
Internet as the world's master library, a storehouse of information from 
which either libraries or patrons can choose.149 Under this view, Web pub-
145. The argument here is that this distinction separates judgments that are consistent 
with the library' s role from those that are not. Whether the distinction is judicially man-
ageable is a separate issue. Considerations of judicial manageability may support drawing 
the line between selection and removal in the context of book collections. 
146. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
147. See Peltz, supra note 18, at 465 ("Librarianship, after all, is about helping peo-
ple access and sift information and ideas; librarianship, ideally, is not about deciding 
what information people may access and what they may not."). 
148. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 n.3 ('" We are wary of the notion that a partial 
analogy in one context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range 
of decisions in such a new and changing area."') (quoting Denver Area Educ. Tele-
comms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)). Compare FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726 ( 1978) (upholding regulation of indecent radio broadcast), with 
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down regula-
tion of indecent dial-a-porn). 
149. See, e.g. , ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 ("[The Internet] is 'no more than a techno-
logical extension of the book stack."') (quoting S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999)); Lou-
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lishers, and their First Amendment interests, lie outside the library. This 
view, however, minimizes one of the greatest assets of the Internet: its in-
teractive nature. In a library's book stacks, the line between speaker and 
listener is clear, but on the Internet, the line becomes blurred. Publication 
on the Internet is relatively cheap and easy, so that library patrons now 
have the ability to add to the "library" themselves by setting up their own 
Web pages, which can then be accessed by other patrons and everyone 
else. The recent rise in blogging, the creation of online journals, is expand-
ing the universe of Internet authors even more.150 
More importantly, much of the Internet is designed to integrate the 
speech of many different participants so that each is simultaneously 
speaker and listener. Personal Web pages invite visitors to comment in 
guestbooks, which other visitors can then read. Auction sites invite buyers 
and sellers to post feedback, which is then read by other potential buyers 
and sellers. Online forums provide places where communities can gather 
to discuss issues; in such a setting, it is hard to imagine a line between au-
thors and readers. The existence and proliferation of online forums par-
ticularly suggests that even as an information gathering tool, the Internet is 
different from a· book collection. By allowing individuals to ask and an-
swer questions and to post running commentary, online forums invite us-
ers to participate more actively in the process of finding information (by 
asking questions), and to contribute more directly to the store of informa-
tion (by answering questions or posting comments). 
All of this suggests that even if library Internet access is not a "public 
forum for Web publishers to express themselves," 151 at least when "Web 
publishers" refers to people outside the library, it may well be a public fo-
rum for library patrons to express themselves.152 When the library filters 
out personal Web pages or (the aptly named) online forums, it restricts not 
only its patrons' ability to access information, but also their ability to pro-
vide information and to participate in discussions. 153 
doun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The Internet therefore more closely 
resembles plaintiffs' analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which defendants 
have laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for library patrons."). 
150. See Pamela LiCalzi O'Connell, Online Diary: Blog Bog, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2003, at G3 (citing a study predicting 5.86 million active biogs in 2004). 
151. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2305. 
152. See Bell, supra note 64, at 207 (suggesting that for the receipt of information, 
libraries are at least limited public forums, and are perhaps even traditional public fo-
rums); Peltz, supra note 18, at 463 (same). 
153. It makes no difference that the library provides only the conduit and not the 
space on which the speech resides. We would never allow the post office to filter mail 
under the theory that it is merely a conduit for the speech and that private alternatives 
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Libraries might assert that the interactive features of the Internet are 
beyond the scope of what they intend to provide their patrons. Indeed, 
some libraries restrict or prohibit the use of Internet access for email, chat 
groups, or online games, and man{4 such restrictions may be constitutional 
because they are content-neutral.1 4 Other libraries might provide access to 
online databases through an Internet connection, but not provide general 
Internet access. 155 A library cannot, however, provide general Internet ac-
cess and then claim that it does not intend for its patrons to speak. It can-
not claim that it intends for its patrons to retrieve information from the 
Internet, but not to post to online forums. Such distinctions are not consis-
tent with the nature and functioning of the Internet;156 on the Internet, 
posting to online forums is an integral part of information retrieval. 
Thus, regardless of how a library might characterize its intent, library 
Internet access is, at least in part, a forum for its patrons' speech. Because 
this speech is integral to the public discourse on the Internet as a whole, 
this forum constitutes a limited public forum, and restrictions on it should 
be subject to strict scrutiny.157 Where government venues intersect with 
existing media, the characteristics of the media matter, and the govern-
ment is not free to define its venues in any way it sees fit. 
C. The Constitutionality of Congress' Funding Condition 
The framework developed in Part III.A can also be used to address the 
question of whether CIPA might be unconstitutional even if library filter-
ing were constitutional. The focus of the inquiry, however, is different. 
We are no longer concerned with the role of libraries as regulators of the 
Internet, but rather with their role as targets of federal regulation. In both 
cases, courts should consider the institutional role of libraries, but they 
should be asking different questions, because in the one case, the library is 
the government entity, and in the other case, the library is a participant in 
the government space. Clearly delineating between these two views of li-
braries is crucial to avoiding a strange irony of the plurality opinion. That 
opinion celebrates the role of libraries in making independent editorial 
judgments in order to demonstrate the constitutionality of a federal pro-
gram that constrains those judgments. 
exist to accomplish the same result. 
154. See Laughlin, supra note 136, at 260. 
155. See Peltz, supra note 18, at 402-03. 
156. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
157. Mandatory library filtering for adults cannot pass strict scrutiny, since there are 
many less restrictive alternatives that serve the government's interests. See ALA I, 201 F. 
Supp. 2d 401 , 471-84 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Peltz, supra note 18, at 466-68 (arguing 
that even if filtering were the least restrictive means, it would not be narrowly drawn). 
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To begin to untwist the logic, recall that if library filtering is itself un-
constitutional, then CIP A is also unconstitutional. Hence, for the purposes 
of this section, we will assume that library filtering is constitutional. Al-
thou~h there are multiple ways the Court could have reached this find-
ing, 1 8 the most likely route, and the one the Court actually used, involves 
first determining that libraries have a broad discretion that encompasses 
the decision to filter Internet access. If libraries do have such broad discre-
tion, however, they must also have some form of First Amendment rights, 
and the Court should have held that CIP A unconstitutionally conditions 
funding on the surrender of these rights. 159 
First, if libraries have sufficient editorial discretion to decide whether 
or not to filter Internet access, that discretion should be protected under 
the First Amendment. In Forbes, the Court held that " [w]hen a public 
broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation 
of its programming, it engages in speech activity."160 If a library has simi-
lar discretion in its selection decisions, as the plurality found, 161 then it 
should follow that the library's selection decisions are also a form of 
speech activity. Likewise, the Court has held that the "editorial control and 
judgment" that a newspaper exercises in deciding what to print is a form 
of speech protected by the First Amendment.162 Any editorial judgment 
that the library exercises over what to provide its patrons should be simi-
larly protected. 
Furthermore, if the library's decisionmaking can be properly analo-
gized to that of a newspaper, Rosenberger should have guided the Court in 
ALA //. 163 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a university fund to subsi-
dize student newspapers was a limited public forum, and that therefore, 
the university could not refuse to subsidize religious publications.164 
Viewed differently, the Court essentially struck down the university's re-
158. For example, the Court could have applied strict scrutiny, but then determined 
that library filtering passes strict scrutiny. 
159. See also R. Polle Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
755, 802-04 (1999) (arguing that libraries' editorial rights have First Amendment status 
and that under "current unconstitutional conditions doctrine," the Court would be 
unlikely to allow Congress to require filters on library computers purchased with non-
federal funds). 
160. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
l 6 l. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (2003). 
162. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a 
newspaper could not be compelled to print a political candidate's reply to an attack pre-
viously printed in the newspaper). 
163. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
l 64. Id. at 834-37. 
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quirement that funding recipients not publish religious content. The fed-
eral subsidy programs constrained by CIPA, like the university subsidy 
program at issue in Rosenberger, provides funds with which individual 
libraries can determine what content to make available to their patrons, 
much as the student newspapers determined what content to make avail-
able to their readers. 165 In both cases, the funding programs established 
limited public forums, and courts should subject to strict scrutiny any re-
strictions on the content that funding recipients can make available. The 
government should not be allowed to condition access to a limited public 
forum on the surrender of editorial discretion. 
The plurality asserted that Rosenberger was inapplicable because, 
once again, "public libraries do not install Internet terminals to provide a 
forum for Web publishers to express themselves." 166 This claim, besides 
being suspect for the reasons noted above, 167 confuses the role of libraries 
as regulators with the role of libraries as targets of regulation. In analyzing 
the constitutionality of CIP A under the assumption that library filtering is 
constitutional, the question is not how to characterize a library's decision 
to install Internet terminals, but how to characterize Congress' decision to 
subsidize Internet access. It is the latter question that sheds light on the 
relevant issue of whether the federal subsidy programs established a lim-
ited public forum. 168 Congress has made it clear that the goal of federal 
subsidies for library Internet access is to expand public access to the re-
sources available on the Internet, and to help bridge the digital divide.169 
Such programs are thus designed to facilitate private speech and encour-
age public discourse, key attributes of limited public forums. 
The plurality's argument that CIPA should be viewed as merely 
bounding the scope of the federal programs 170 is inconsistent with the re-
spective roles of the federal government and of local libraries. To the ex-
tent that libraries make editorial judgments, constraints on these judgments 
are not consistent with the federal government's social role, and thus 
should be seen as external to federal subsidy programs, not an integral part 
165. See id. 
166. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 n.7. 
167. See supra Part IIl.8.2. 
168. Indeed, by assuming that library filtering is constitutional, we are essentially 
assuming that library Internet access is not a limited public forum. See supra note 157 
and accompanying text. 
169. See 20 U.S.C. § 9121 (2000); see also ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 , 411-12 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002); Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet 
Protection Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Librar-
ies, 80 W ASH. U. L.Q. 1025, I 025-27 (2002). 
170. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307-08. 
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of defining the programs' scope. 17 1 Considering a hypothetical statute will 
help clarify this point. Suppose Congress established a subsidy program to 
allow libraries to purchase newspapers, but then required all funded librar-
ies to exclude newspapers that print comics. 172 Such a requirement might 
be perfectly rational, but one imagines that courts would see this as an in-
trusion upon libraries' discretion to choose newspaper subscriptions. If 
Congress' decision to condition funding on the content provided through 
library newspapers should be subject to strict scrutiny, so should its deci-
sion to condition funding on the content provided through library Internet 
access. 
173 In both cases, restrictions should be suspect because Congres-
sional discretion is inconsistent with the role of the federal government in 
local libraries. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to determine the constitutionality of regulations on govern-
ment spaces, courts must draw lines between spaces for public discourse 
and spaces for government speech, and between constraints on govern-
ment and constraints on private speakers. This line drawing involves in-
evitably normative judgments, but an analysis of institutions can expose 
these judgments for further debate and should constrain them. The social 
roles of relevant spaces and relevant government entities limits the plausi-
ble characterizations that a court might give to the speech and the regula-
tion at issue. An understanding of the roles of libraries, of Internet access, 
and of the federal government suggests that library filtering is unconstitu-
tional and that such filtering cannot be a constitutional condition of federal 
funding, contrary to the result in ALA II. 
The need for institutional analysis is particularly keen in the context of 
regulation of the Internet. Appeals to precedent invite courts to minimize 
the differences between new media and old. The Internet becomes nothing 
more than a very large library, or perhaps a very comprehensive encyclo-
171. See Bell, supra note 64, at 231 ( suggesting that courts should prefer to insulate 
library professionals from political pressure). 
172. That is, if a library took any funds, it could not subscribe to any such newspa-
pers, using these or other funds. 
173. One might argue that the restriction on Internet access is for a more compelling 
reason than the restriction on newspapers, but this is relevant only to the application of 
strict scrutiny, not the decision to apply strict scrutiny in the first place. Whether the fed-
eral funding condition can pass strict scrutiny essentially depends on whether library fil-
tering would pass strict scrutiny, since any means less restrictive than filtering would also 
provide a less restrictive funding condition. See supra note 157. 
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pedia.174 Courts must be careful to notice the differences, to discuss them, 
and to consider the ways in which they matter. If courts fail to engage in 
this analysis, at best, they may make rulings that are inconsistent with the 
social roles of relevant institutions, and at worst, they risk undermining 
these roles in hidden ways. As Professor Lawrence Lessig points out, the 
Internet has no inherent nature, it is what we make of it. 175 The plurality in 
ALA II crafts its holding under the assumption that the Internet is a one-
way conduit of information subject to centralized control. If courts con-
tinue to uphold Internet regulation under the same assumption, this as-
sumption may become reality. While the merits of such a shift are cer-
tainly open to debate, at the very least, courts and society should engage 
the debate in an open and transparent manner. After all, that is what the 
First Amendment is about. 
17 4. See supra note 149. 
175. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LA ws OF CYBERSPACE 5-6 ( 1999). 
